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Abstract
Since banks and insurance companies are financial institutions dealing with risks in vari-
ous aspects of their business, it is important to make a general approach to the issue of 
risk and risk management from the perspective of these institutions. In that regard, we 
made a short overview of the risks these institutions are faced to as well as the methods 
they use for risk assessments. In order to limit our research to specific financial markets, 
we provided the basic characteristics of bank and insurance markets of Southeastern 
Europe (SEE), presenting the core indicators of development level of these markets and 
their legal and institutional environment related to new regulation proposed in Europe. 
We analyzed the level of implementation of Basel and Solvency risk assessment stan-
dards in these countries and tried to anticipate direction(s) where these markets are 
going to move in the coming period.
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1. Introduction
The global financial crisis (2007–2009) severely tested the ability of intermediaries to effec-
tively manage and control the various types of risk, revealing the incoherence between the 
risks taken and perceived as well as profound weaknesses in risk governance. Since as early 
as 2009, the OECD, the Senior Supervisors Group, the G-30, and the European Commission 
itself have denounced the close interdependence between the serious deficiencies in banks’ 
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organizational and control systems, and the equally serious inadequacy of risk governance. 
In 2009, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued a policy document 
“Enhancements to the Basel II framework - Supplemental Pillar 2 practices” (part of the 
package is better known as B2.5). The document highlighted the need to “overcome orga-
nizational silos between business lines” and the urgent need to enhance “firm-wide over-
sight, risk management and controls.” The interventions it indicated as necessary in order 
to improve the overall risk governance system included: strengthening of the board’s and 
senior management’s role of guidance and control, including through definition of the risk 
appetite framework (RAF), risk management and internal control systems integrated at 
entire group level, and an appropriate management information system (MIS) at business 
unit and group level.
This undoubtedly provided the seedbed for the ongoing proliferation of standards on risks 
and capital we have witnessed in recent years, intended, desirably, to lay the foundations for 
solidity and stability of individual banks and, consequently, ensure resilience of the financial 
system in its entirety. A proliferation which might, at times, appear excessive considering 
the great amount of sound practices, principles, regulatory frameworks regarding risks and 
capital produced by the regulator in recent years. The new regulatory framework, known as 
Basel III, introduced an in-depth reform of banking regulation and constitutes a significant 
step forward, resulting in interaction between supervision of individual banks (known as 
“microprudential supervision”) and supervision of the banking and financial system as a 
whole (“macroprudential supervision”) [1].
With regard to capital, through the new Basel III regulations, the supervisory authorities saw 
fit to bring the concept of supervisory capital closer to that of capital from an accounting 
perspective, since the set had previously included tools that did not constitute capital in the 
strict sense and which were therefore unusable for covering operating losses recorded during 
the bank’s operation. Furthermore, Basel II’s concept of supervisory capital included financial 
resources treated differently in the various European countries, and this caused a problem in 
comparing the capital of the various banking institutions.
The new rules were intended to render capital structure simpler and more transparent as 
well as improve the quality and quantity of supervisory capital. In particular, it was estab-
lished that the new concept of capital would include just two levels: Tier 1 (comprising com-
mon equity Tier 1 capital and additional Tier 1 capital) and Tier 2. The first was intended to 
ensure corporate continuity (going concern), while the second would absorb losses in the 
event of serious difficulties and liquidation (gone concern). Tier 3 capital was therefore elim-
inated in order to ensure that market risk was covered by the same capital resources used 
to cover the other risks. To improve the quality of supervisory capital, it was established 
that, in order to perform its function, Tier 1 would have to be composed predominantly 
of common equity (ordinary shares and retained earnings, therefore excluding preference 
shares and savings shares) and constitute the most subordinate component in redemption 
and remuneration (i.e., the most stable) as well as the one most available to absorb manage-
ment losses. Other capital resources may be included in Tier 1, to a limited extent and on 
condition that they are subordinate, do not have obligatory remuneration, do not have a 
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maturity or incentives to redeem, and are adequate to absorb management losses.1 Besides, 
to improve the quantity of  supervisory capital, Basel II provided that the overall required 
capital provision had to be equal to at least 8% of risk-weighted assets, while, in accordance 
with the new Basel II regulations, it must be equal to at least 10.5% of risk-weighted assets. 
In particular, it was established that common equity must be equal to at least 7% of risk-
weighted assets and supplemented by two buffers which would be introduced gradually: 
a conservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer. The conservation buffer must be equal 
to 2.5% of the bank’s overall risk exposure and be composed of common equity. It must be 
intended for conservation of corporate continuity, in other words absorption of losses dur-
ing crisis periods. The countercyclical buffer may be equal to a maximum of 2.5% of risk-
weighted assets and must be built up during favorable periods of the economic cycle, when 
risk is accumulated, for possible use when conditions deteriorate and risk materializes. This 
must be observed by setting aside common equity or other capital resources capable of fully 
absorbing losses, and its purpose is to achieve the broader macroprudential objective of 
protecting the banking sector from phases of excessive total credit expansion in relation to 
GDP (contain the procyclicality phenomenon). It is not obligatory for this buffer to always be 
built up like the first one, and it may even be less than 2.5%, at the discretion of the national 
authorities.
For implementation of the Basel III Accord, the European Commission transposed its content 
into the following two legislative acts:
• CRD IV (Capital Requirement Directive IV)2, which concerns, among other things, the con-
ditions for taking-up and pursuit of the business of banks, right of establishment and free-
dom to provide services, the prudential control process and additional capital reserves. In 
order to be applicable, this directive must be transposed into the legislation of the various 
nations;
• CRR (Capital Requirement Regulation) [2], which governs first-tier prudential supervi-
sors and the rules on public disclosure (capital, leverage ratio (LR), counterparty credit 
risk, and liquidity risk). The inclusion of prudential rules in a regulation responds to the 
objective of creating a set of rules valid throughout Europe which are as harmonized as 
possible for intermediaries operating in the single market. This regulation does not need to 
be transposed into the respective national legislations and is therefore directly applicable 
in the various Member States, thus rendering the regulation and supervision process faster 
and simpler.
In this new regulatory context, the risk management function (risk assessment, measurement, 
monitoring, and reporting) of undertakings and their various businesses assumes strategic 
importance.
1 A list has been prepared of 14 criteria which must be met, individually and jointly, in order for a resource to be included 
under common equity.
2In the case of smaller banks, in particular, it is observed that the types of risk classified as key risks often comprise only 
credit risk, market risk, and operational risk and that supervisory risk measurement methods are also deployed inter-
nally to measure these risks.
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2. Role of risk assessment in banks and insurance companies
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines risk as the hazard, the chance of a bad conse-
quence, loss or exposure to an accident. This is actually the definition of downside risk (“bad” 
or “real” risk, the risk of loss), which we often encounter in everyday life. The upside risk is 
opposite to the downside risk, which rarely happens and relates to the potential for gain.
Financial risk is considered sui generis, and it can be defined as any event or activity that may 
adversely affect the ability of an organization, commonly a bank or an insurance company, to 
achieve its objectives or implement its strategies. Alternatively, risk is also defined as measur-
able probability of loss or reduced expected return [3]. In fact, contemporary understanding 
of the financial risk refers to the downside risks associated with financial institutions, that is, 
banks and insurance companies, and the volatility related to their returns.
Since the banks and insurance companies are professional risk takers and they operate on the 
basis of transferred powers and trusts (by depositors and insureds), their risk management 
(including assessment) is subject to regulatory constraints, especially in the sense of applying 
the Basel and Solvency standards, in order to reduce the systemic risk (the primary objective 
of regulation in banking) and to protect the insureds (the primary objective of regulation in 
insurance sector). The most recognized type of risk in banking is probably the market risk, 
or the risk of a change in the value of a financial position due to variation of the value of the 
underlying factors, such as stock and bond prices, exchange rates, commodity prices, and so 
on. The next important category is credit risk (or default risk), which is the risk of not receiv-
ing promised payments on executed investments (such as loans and bonds) due to borrower’s 
default. Another risk category, which in recent times has been receiving increasing attention, 
is operational risk, which is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate management of informa-
tion telecommunications and other systems as well as from inappropriate internal procedures, 
processes and controls, weaknesses, omissions, employee irregularities and errors, external 
illegal actions or unforeseen external events that have a potential to cause physical damage to 
assets of the bank, and so on.
Special risk-type insurers are faced to is underwriting risk, that is, the risk inherent to insur-
ance policies. Risk factors which are important here are as follows: changes of the ways of 
national catastrophes, demographic changes, changes in customer behavior (e.g., prepay-
ment), and so on.
It is very difficult if not impossible to identify all types of risks that could possibly occur in 
the operations of today’s financial institutions. This is even a bigger challenge when we con-
sider the complexity due to interactions between various types of risks and the ever-changing 
environment in which the financial institutions operate. However, the taxonomy of the risks 
associated with financial services identifies the risk types presented in Table 1.
The only effective way to successfully manage financial risks is in a holistic, integrated approach 
that takes into account all types of risks and their interactions. Traditional “silo” approach has 
been less effective as it assumes isolated treatment of certain types of financial risks.
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3. New regulatory risk assessment framework in Europe
The regulation associated with the financial risk management stems from early finance his-
tory, such as Venetian banks and the early insurance companies that emerged from London 
Market risk • Interest rate risk
• Exchange rate risk
Credit risk • Active vs. passive credit risk
• Credit risk specific to the company vs. systemic credit risk
Counterparty risk • The risk of an ineffective client or a trading partner
Liquidity risk • Normal liquidity risk
• Crisis liquidity risk
Operational risk • Technical risks
• Organizational risks
Risk inherent with insurance 
policies
• Negative (wrong) selection risk
• Moral hazard
Legal risk • Risk related to changes in law, court judgements, or regulations
• Fraud and violations of regulatory violations by employees of a financial 
institution
Model-related risk • Risks associated with bad models when determining the value of financial 
instruments
• Inaccurate risk assessment of trading activities due to bad models for 
decision-making
Event-related risk • Stock market collapse
• Sudden changes in the tax system
• Sudden changes in regulatory policy
• Currency exchange rate extreme volatility
• Terrorist attacks
• Various disasters (wars, revolutions, earthquakes, extreme weather)
Strategic risk • Risks associated with the business plans and strategies of financial institutions
Business risk • Business cycle risks
• Revenue fluctuations (commission based, for example)
Reputational risk • Risk associated with bad reputation and negative publicity that leads to loss of 
income
Systemic risk • Interest rates variations
• Base risk
• Inflation
Solvency risk • Definitive and aggregate risk of financial institutions
Source: [4].
Table 1. Financial risks taxonomy.
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coffee shops in the eighteenth century. However, the key developments that have led to the 
current international regulatory framework and financial risk management are a typical 
twentieth-century story.
3.1. Path to regulation of financial risks
Most regulations associated with the financial (especially banking) risks resulted from 
the BCBS. While the BCBS does not have any formal supranational supervisory author-
ity, it formulates some general supervisory standards and guidelines. It also defines and 
recommends the best practice, with the expectation that relevant authorities will take 
the necessary steps to implement it through detailed arrangements (prescribed by law 
or otherwise), best suited to their respective national systems. It is important to note that 
the original guidelines referred to only “internationally active” banks, which has since 
changed.
On 11 July 1988, the BCBS issued “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards,” or “Capital Accord,” and then on 19 January 1996, adopted a corre-
sponding amendment (“Amendment to the Capital Acord to Incorporate Market Risks”). The 
Capital Accord, including the Amendment, is primarily focused on the protection of banks 
against credit and market (interest and currency) risks. On one hand, banks require linking 
between the credit risks and prescribed capital reserves and capital adequacy ratios, while, 
on the other hand, they are free to determine their capital reserves for market risks by using 
internal models, primarily so-called Value-et-Risk (VaR) model.
Over the recent years, we have witnessed a growing regulatory pressure on the insur-
ance sector, linked with the combination of the two regulatory frameworks: institu-
tional or methodological. For example, the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates was 
founded in early 1996, under the patronage of the BCBS, the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the International Insurance Supervision Association 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). This body was formed with the 
aim to take over the so-called Tripartite Group, which handled the supervisory issues related 
to financial conglomerates since 1993 and until July 1995. The Joint Forum includes the same 
number of supervisors of older banks, insurance companies, and financial services compa-
nies (investment banks, brokers, and dealers), representing each supervisory unit, or three 
parent organizations.
A complete set of baseline rules for prudential supervision, also well known as Basel I, has 
significantly stepped up with regard to the effective determination of the minimum inter-
national capital standards. This historic agreement was signed in July 1988 by the member 
countries of Group 10, Luxembourg and Spain. It came into full force in January 1993. To 
date, these rules have been accepted by over 100 countries. There is an understanding and 
expectation that banking credibility is not satisfactory if Basel rules about business operations 
are not implemented. Basel I accepted a standard division of total banking capital into two 
basic components (Table 2).
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The current rate of the required regulatory capital for a bank to qualify as adequately capital-
ized implies the following [6]:
• The percentage of the primary capital ratio (CR) and the total weighted risk must be at 
least 4%.
• The percentage of total capital to total risk-weighted assets must be at least 8%, with sec-
ondary capital limited to 100% of the primary capital.
Despite having historically assisted in the development of an international framework for 
the regulation of financial risks, Basel I has also been subjected to criticism. Two main areas 
come to focus as limiting: a fairly general approach to credit risk and the failure to appreci-
ate the impact of market risk. In the context of strengthening connections between banks and 
financial markets (the so-called market banking) and the increased banking risks in the field 
of financial instruments, foreign exchange instruments, and derivative positions, the BCBS 
published some new proposals in 1993. They focused on the requirement for banks that faced 
higher degree of exposure to market risk that they hold a higher quantum of capital with 
regard to the size of their assets. The Basel I amendments in 1996 prescribed a standardized 
market risk model, while at the same time allowing larger and more sophisticated banks to 
choose an internal model based on VaR (an in-house developed model). Legal implementa-
tion of these amendments was achieved in 1998.
Instead of a standard methodology, banks may alternatively use internal models when evalu-
ating market risks if they have adequate internal market risk management systems. However, 
these systems must be explicitly accepted by the appropriate supervisory agency. This agency 
prescribes general qualitative and quantitative standards, which must be integrated into 
internal models for the assessment of market risks and the formation of an adequate level of 
capital. For example, a 10-day VaR of EUR 20 million at a confidence level of 99% means that 
the market portfolio will cause a loss of EUR 20 million or more with a probability of 1% until 
the end of the 10-day holding period, if the composition of the portfolio remains unchanged 
during the same period. The choice of the holding period (10 days) and the level of reliability 
I Primary capital (core capital)
• Share capital
• Retained profits
II Secondary capital (supplementary capital)
• Subordinated bonds with a maturity of over 5 years
• General reserves for loss coverage
• Latent reserves
• Valorization reserves
III (I + II) Total capital
Source: [5].
Table 2. Basic structure of bank capital.
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(99%) lie in the hands of the regulator only when VaR is used to calculate regulatory capital3; 
otherwise, it is arbitrated. The main qualitative standards are as follows [7]:
• Internal models must be integrated into daily bank risk management processes.
• The board of directors and senior management of the bank should be actively involved in 
the risk control processes.
• There must be an independent risk control service within the bank.
• Internal models must contain appropriate limits that restrict the exposure to market risks 
at operational level.
• The corrective multiplier must be at least three and can be increased to four, which de-
pends on the results of the backtesting.
• The bank must implement the regulatory program of backtesting of its internal market 
risk model. Namely, we are talking about ex post checks of the efficiency of the internal 
model by comparing the VaR risk assessment with the actual profits and losses of the bank. 
Backtesting should show whether or not the specific internal model used by the bank is a 
reliable measure of potential losses. If backtesting shows satisfactory results, the corrective 
multiplier holds the value of three; otherwise, it can be increased to four.
• The bank should have a readily available rigorous stress-testing program.
The main quantitative standards relate to the following rules:
• The VaR determination is performed on a daily basis with a 99% confidence level.
• The holding period for the risk calculation due to the holding of financial instruments is at 
least 10 working days.
• The statistical basis for VaR accounts must be at least 1 year, but the audit is done at least 
at quarterly intervals.
• The supervisory authorities do not prescribe a certain internal model that banks have to 
adhere to, so it is possible to use various models, ensuring that qualitative and quantitative 
standards are being followed. An internal model determined by a bank must obtain the 
explicit consent of the supervisory authority.
On 26 June 2004, the central bank governors and supervisory directors of Group 10 published 
the changes to capital framework, called Basel II. The key conceptual change within Basel II is 
the introduction of the concept of three tiers.
3.2. The three-tier concept
Tier 1 (risk assessment) requires that the banks calculate the minimum capital charge, which 
relates to regulatory capital, in order to quantify the minimum capital in relation to the 
3Bank is required to provide equity for market risk equal to the average VaR estimate for the last 60 days, which is further 
multiplied by the safety coefficient (usually equal to three).
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potential economic loss. According to Basel II, there is a cost of capital for credit risk, market 
risk, and (for the first time!) operational risk. While the treatment of market risk is relatively 
unchanged from the Basel II Amendment of 1996, the cost of capital for credit risk has been 
significantly changed. In calculating the cost of capital for credit and operational risk, banks 
can make a choice between three different approaches in increasing the sensitivity and com-
plexity of the risk: the basic indicator approach, standardized approach, and advanced mea-
surement approach (internal methodology using quantitative and qualitative criteria).
Any quantitative approach to risk management should be embedded in the functional govern-
ing structure of an institution. Therefore, the best practice in risk management imposes clear 
restrictions on the organization of the institution (board of directors, management, employees, 
internal, and external audit processes). Specifically, the Board of Directors assumes ultimate 
responsibility for the failure of the “landscape” risk and the risk appetite formulation. This is 
where the Tier 2 (risk management) comes in. With this important tier, which is designated 
as a supervisory audit process, local regulators perform various checks, bringing the order of 
balance. This tier starts from the need for an effective overview of the bank’s internal overall 
risk assessment and ensures that the management trains the “sound” of the assessment and 
set aside the adequate capital for various risks.
Finally, in order to fulfill the promise that the growing regulation will also reduce the sys-
temic risk, clear guidelines on risk reporting by financial institutions are also required. Tier 3 
(risk transparency) requires the establishment of a market discipline through more effective 
communication of risk measures and other information relevant to risk management.
In analogy to Basel II, the structure of the Solvency 2, regulatory regime in the insurance sec-
tor, is also set up as a three-tier structure.
3.3. From Solvency 1 to Solvency 2
Until the latter half of the 1980s, the insurance sector was notable for its substantial “staticity,” 
having, for a long time, been sheltered from environmental and regulatory disturbance and 
not being marked by any particular vivacity in terms of product and process innovation. The 
shifting environmental conditions of the last 25 years, affecting the structure of the insurance 
market and the financial system in general (consequent to the process of deregulation and 
internationalization of the industry that colored the 1990s), have, however, triggered pro-
found changes in ownership structures, forms of competition, and distribution patterns, and, 
overall, in the management techniques of insurance undertakings [8].
The supervisory system has not been unaffected by this process of profound change, also 
undergoing significant alteration. The specific nature of this evolution is evident in the move 
from supervision based essentially on “structural” monitoring methods to other, “pruden-
tial” methods as well as in the strengthening of supervision on consolidated foundations and 
in the increase in cooperation agreements between the Supervisory Authorities at national 
and international levels.
The insurance (and reinsurance) sector—albeit on a different timescale to the banking one but 
in fundamentally similar ways—has not been left “untouched” by this evolutionary  process 
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either and, following a long “gestation” period, on 1 January 2016, the new regulatory regime 
known as “Solvency 2,” pursuant to Directive 2009/138/EC (containing the general princi-
ples), together with the additional levels of the legislation (containing greater detail)4, was 
introduced throughout the European Union (EU). While Solvency 1 proved itself to func-
tion without causing serious “trauma,” given that the financial crisis did not highlight any 
significant cases of bankruptcy of insurance undertakings, its limitations were evident right 
from the early 2000s (in other words, from the start-up phase of the draft revision of the 
current regulatory regime). Moreover, the undisputed merits of its extremely simple and 
robust regulatory infrastructure were countered by a series of critical issues which called its 
future applicability into question. In this perspective, Solvency 1—characterized essentially 
by its solvency margin requirements, its requirements for risk quantification of commitments 
undertaken, and its quantitative and qualitative limits on assets to cover liabilities—induced 
scholars, practitioners, and the supervisory system itself to highlight the relative limitations5 
and identify the possible solutions [9].
One of the main criticisms leveled at Solvency 1 is that, being a model based on flat rates, 
it neither took due account of the specific riskiness of each undertaking nor considered the 
portfolio of risks to which an undertaking is exposed, on the assets and liabilities sides [10]. 
Indeed, Solvency 1 not only provided (on the liabilities side) for application of essentially 
flat rates to technical parameters which often revealed insufficiencies in the rounding of the 
risks of an undertaking’s insurance portfolio, but also did not take account of the quality 
of the said portfolio or (on the assets side) of the investments made in order to provide 
adequate cover. This resulted in the clear paradox that two insurance undertakings showing 
(on the liabilities side) the same riskiness are required to hold the same capital for supervi-
sion purposes despite clearly differing (on the assets side) in terms of the riskiness of their 
investments.
The need to remedy the said limitations spurred European legislators to initiate an in-depth 
review of the system for supervision of company solvency in insurance undertakings, with 
a view to comprehensive innovation of the supervisory prudential rules in order to ensure 
a level playing field within the insurance sector and create a new, risk-oriented regulatory 
framework (Solvency 2) [11]. In this regard, the end goal aimed for was the definition of a 
prudential supervisory system involving appropriate capital requirements, in other words 
“tailored” to the risks to which insurance undertakings are actually exposed and capable 
of incentivizing more careful measurement and management of these by the intermediaries 
themselves.
4We refer, in particular, to: the delegated acts adopted by the Commission through Regulation 2015/35 of 10 October 
2014: amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/467 of 30 September 2015:, 16 implementing regula-
tions (ITS: Implementing Technical Standards) proposed by the EIOPA (European Insurance and Occupational Pension 
Authority) and adopted by the Commission and, finally, the EIOPA guidelines which, unlike the previous (directly ap-
plicable) regulations, must be transposed into the individual national legal systems.
5These limitations may be identified, in summary, as: (a) the lack of transparency of the insolvency margin criterion 
and its inadequacy in expressing the risks taken by undertakings, (b) the absence of incentives for undertakings to 
perform effective risk management, and (c) the lack of recognition of the economic situation of transnational groups of 
undertakings.
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3.4. Risk assessment in the light of Basel III
The BCBS reached a consensus regarding the Basel III framework on 26 July 2010. On 30 
November 2010, the G-20 leaders indorsed the framework at the summit in Seoul, South 
Korea. Basically, Basel III relies on the Basel II framework. Basel III has three objectives that 
are articulated by the Committee: to address the issues which led to the global financial cri-
sis and the lessons learned from the crisis, improve risk management and governance, and 
strengthen bank’s transparency and disclosures. The Basel III Accord is characterized as a 
successive process in which banks are to increase the primary capital ratio from 2 to 7% in 
several years to come. The total implementation of Basel III is expected on 1 January 2019. 
Regulators believe that under crisis banks may temporarily reduce the ratio to 4.5%, but are 
not allowed to pay bonuses and dividends until they return the ratio to 7%.
In addition to the Basel II capital ratio, Basel III requires banks to respect additional ratios, 
such as leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), and net stable funding ratio (NSFR). 
The risk-based capital ratio (CR) requires that 8% of risk-weighted assets are covered by tier 
1-capital plus tier 2-capital. The volume-based leverage ratio (LR) requires banks to hold 
3% T1-capital against total assets. The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) stipulates that stable-
funding weighted assets are to be 100% covered by stable-funding weighted liabilities. The 
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requires that outflows are 100% covered by inflows plus the 
(haircut-weighted) liquidity reserve [12].
The new Basel III regulatory framework increases the importance of the risk management 
process, which includes risk assessment. Indeed, risk assessment is a strategic phase of 
the risk management process. However, new developments in financial markets, finan-
cial management practices, operational complexity, and supervisory approaches and 
rules (Basel II) have, over the last decade, created new risks, cross-type risks, interrelation 
between traditional risks (such as counterparty risk, credit risk, market risk, operational 
risk, and liquidity risk) and increased the importance of the risk management process, 
infrastructure, and governance. All this has presented the risk management function with 
a great challenge.
Article 86 of Directive 2013/36/EU [13] requires undertakings to have robust strategies, poli-
cies, processes, and systems for identification, measurement, management, and monitoring 
of liquidity risk over an appropriate set of time horizons and management and monitoring 
of funding positions, in order to ensure that they maintain adequate liquidity buffers and 
funding (commonly referred to as the “Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process”: 
ILAAP). Risk assessment is an extremely critical phase of this process and should cover the 
major sources of financial intermediaries. As we know, risk assessment is the starting point 
for the “Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process” (ICAAP) and, also, for strategic, cap-
ital, and liquidity planning, the “Risk Appetite Framework” (RAF)6 and the “Recovery Plan.”
6The RAF is the reference framework that defines an undertaking’s risk appetite, tolerance thresholds, risk limits, risk 
management policies, the relevant processes necessary to define, and implement these in line with the maximum risk 
that may be taken, business model and strategic plan.
Implementation of Basel and Solvency Risk Assessment Standards in Banks and Insurance...
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.70605
235
The EBA guidelines [14] aim to achieve convergence of supervisory practices in the assess-
ment of ICAAP and ILAAP as required by the SREP Guidelines, by introducing a common 
set of information that competent authorities will be using in their assessments across the 
EU. In particular, the guidelines aim to specify what general and ICAAP- and ILAAP-
specific information competent authorities should collect from institutions following their 
minimum engagement model as specified in the SREP Guidelines. In this perspective, the 
EBA guidelines recommend that financial intermediaries prepare a list of risk categories 
and subcategories covered by ICAAP, including their definitions and parameters of indi-
vidual risk categories, a description of their approach to the identification of risks (includ-
ing risk concentrations) and the inclusions of identified risks within risk categories and 
subcategories to be covered. On evidencing the implementation of the scope, the general 
objectives, and the main assumptions underlying ICAAP, competent authorities should 
ensure that they receive from institutions the following: (a) list of risk categories and sub-
categories covered by ICAAP, including their definitions and perimeters of individual risk 
categories; (b) explanations of the differences between the risks covered by ICAAP and the 
risk appetite framework, where the scope of risks covered is different; and (c) description 
of any deviations in the ICAAP process and in the key assumptions within the group and 
the entities of the group, where appropriate. The effectiveness of the risk management 
process as a whole depends, in fact, on the quality of the risk assessment (thoroughness, 
coherence with the bank’s business model, etc.) and is consolidated over time if there 
exists, within the financial intermediary, a continual process of reconciliation between 
capital and liquidity planning, the ICAAP, the RAF and the Recovery Plan, governance, 
structure and organization. However, the goal of alignment and coherence constraint 
remains an aspiration for many undertakings because it requires a holistic approach to 
bank governance.
In this perspective, it is important to understand the way in which undertakings perform their 
risk assessments. There is no single approach for all banks because they usually have different 
business models, strategies, capital and liquidity buffers, operational complexity structures 
and governance, and, therefore, different risks.
In general terms, the risk map should be: exhaustive, transparent, consistent, and well-inte-
grated into the business model (holistic approach). Firstly, the assessment should include 
all risks to which undertakings are or could be exposed (principle of exhaustiveness). This 
should include difficult-to-measure risks such as compliance risk and reputational risk. 
Secondly, the methodology used to assess and measure exposure should be duly documented 
together with the assumptions used during the risk assessment process (principle of transpar-
ency). Nevertheless, the risk assessment process should be consistent and aligned with other 
institutions’ processes and with the nature, size, complexity, and scale of the bank’s business 
activities.
Faced with these procedural principles, we might ask ourselves: which risks do undertak-
ings consider in their assessments? In the case of smaller banks, in general, the types of risk 
classified as key risks often comprise only credit risk, market risk, and operational risk, and 
supervisory risk measurement methods are also deployed internally to measure these risks. 
However, undertakings should, as a minimum, take into account in their assessment the risks 
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recommended by the regulator or supervisory authority. It is important to underline that: 
(a) the risk mapping recommended by the regulator and supervisory authority are not fully 
aligned; (b) the regulator/supervisory authority’s risk mapping is not to be considered man-
datory. It is an undertaking’s choice whether and how to combine risk types and risk sub-
categories. Indeed, the undertaking might classify certain risks differently to the regulator/
supervisory authority. In the opinion of the European Central Bank (ECB) [15], it is important 
to map at least the following risks: (a) credit risk, (b) market risk, (c) operational risk, (d) 
interest rate risk in the banking book, (e) participation or equity risk, (f) sovereign risk, (g) 
pension risk, (h) funding risk, (i) risk concentrations, and (j) business and strategic risk. In the 
case of conglomerates and for material participations (e.g., in insurance undertakings), insti-
tutions are also expected to take inherent risks, such as insurance risk, into account in their 
risk mapping; in the case of other immaterial risks, institutions should explain why these are 
considered immaterial.
It is desirable, also for regulatory purposes, for institutions to define each of the key risks 
listed above as well as any other risks identified as key based on the institution’s risk profile, 
how the institution defines the materiality of each key risk, and a description of how each 
material risk is then quantified for capital allocation purposes, including detailed methodol-
ogy to specify data, assumptions, and calculations. The bank’s assessment of risk indicators 
should also be reflected in its risk policies (measurement, management, and control). This 
means, for example, that a bank which considers country risks to be immaterial will subse-
quently avoid taking on material country risks, that is, the bank will keep activities such as 
proprietary transactions in foreign securities, interbank trading with international counter-
parties, or loans to foreign borrowers to a minimum.
It is important to understand that risk assessment must be based as closely as possible on 
an approach integrated and coherent with the bank’s business model and with risk gover-
nance as a whole, as previously underlined (principle of holism). This is in order to reduce 
overlap between businesses and the associated operational inefficiencies, to develop forms 
of collaboration orientated toward the pursuit operational synergies, and to achieve greater 
impact during the risk measurement, management, and control phases. This is also a cultural 
change whose driving force is the risk management function, called upon to perform a role 
of proactive consultancy in all areas of decision-making and of fruitful dialog with the opera-
tional functions. In this perspective, the risk management function must transition from the 
role of simple “controller” of risk levels and “producer” of information for the benefit of the 
top management and the board to that of influential partner actively involved in strategic 
decision-making processes.
In this regulatory and market context, there is a significant risk, for banking intermediaries, 
of being subjected to the numerous rules and chasing regulatory compliance without suc-
ceeding in germinating the seed of change planted in the new vision for the regulatory and 
supervisory system. In this perspective, it is therefore useful to adopt an integrated, holistic 
approach to risk management (“integrated risk management”). This is not merely a philo-
sophical stance but, rather, a mindset that marks a moment of significant discontinuity with 
the past permeating entire banking undertakings capable of setting aside cultural resistance 
to change and waving of ideological flags. It is an approach that integrates and synergizes:
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• The different regulatory frameworks, often managed and implemented in silos by banking 
intermediaries;
• Risk management under normal and stressed conditions, in line with a backward- and 
forward-looking vision;
• Internal management for risk supervision purposes, therefore incorporating the new SREP, 
strategic planning, ICAAP, ILAAP, RAF, Recovery Plan, capital allocation, liquidity alloca-
tion, market disclosure, and reporting to the regulator.
3.5. The impact and implementation challenges of new regulatory frameworks
According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), implementation statistics regarding 
Basel I as a voluntary standard are impressive. From 2001, over 100 countries worldwide had 
implemented Basel I. Furthermore, from 2004, these countries intended to implement Basel 
II—13 were Basel Committee Members and 88 were non-Basel Committee Members. As of 
2008, 105 countries had either implemented Basel II (57) or intended to implement Basel II 
(48), a total of 13 Basel Committee Members and 92 non-Basel Committee Members.
From 2008, the Basel Committee country membership expanded to include 27 Members, 
emerging countries (such as Argentina and India) as well. What is important, this allows 
emerging countries to join the negotiations about what the “global” supervisory framework 
would look like. Although the Basel accords are intended for implementation by internation-
ally active banks and in developed economies, other economies (and, therefore, emerging) 
are also forced to implement the accords due to international regulatory and competitive-
ness matters. For example, in Asia, at least nine countries had implemented or expected to 
implement Basel II by 2010 (e.g., India, Hong Kong, Japan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and Thailand had implemented several aspects of Basel II as early as by 2008). Moreover, the 
argument for prevention of crises and maintenance bank soundness is supported by the fact 
that banking crises in emerging economies have generally exceeded 25% of GDP and are, 
proportionately, much larger in scale than in developed economies [16].
As far as Solvency 2 is concerned, one of the first absolute innovations is the fact that, while 
the directives issued prior to establishment of the new regulatory regime focused predomi-
nantly on “capital leverage,” with a view to defining the requirements necessary to guarantee 
solvency, the Solvency 2 regulatory framework places risk at the very center of management 
of an insurance undertaking, imposing assessment of the risks peculiar to each of the busi-
nesses they conduct and suggesting risk management criteria.
“… Regulators and rating agencies expect that companies have a good understanding of their risk pro-
files and have implemented the appropriate governance structure to mitigate their risks. The insurance 
industry is everchanging, and it can be challenging for an organization to have a complete understand-
ing of the risks that can pose potential pitfalls to its operations…” [17].
This new approach also affects the modus operandi of the Supervisory Authorities, which are 
consequently called upon to induce insurance undertakings to graduate their recourse to 
and use of capital leverage according to the riskiness of their business and to “mold” their 
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organizational structure according to their ability to cope with the risks taken [18]. In this 
perspective, the new regulatory regime places particular emphasis on an undertaking’s risk 
management system, which consists of the set of strategies, processes, and reporting proce-
dures designed to identify, measure, continually monitor, and thus manage on an ongoing 
basis the risks, at individual and joint levels, to which undertakings and groups are or could 
be exposed, as well as the interdependence of these. The main protection provided by the 
risk management system lies in the identification and measurement (in short, “risk assess-
ment”) of the risks to which the undertaking is exposed. Risk assessment is normally formal-
ized by the risk management function which, based on the evidence provided by the other, 
second-level control functions (internal auditing, compliance, and actuarial function), and 
on the findings of the control activities carried out by the business functions responsible for 
management of the above-mentioned risks, highlights their presence and provides a quali-
quantitative assessment of them.
As we have already stated, adoption of the regulatory requirements of Solvency 2 is not lim-
ited simply to application of a new capital requirement calculation methodology and new 
accounting standards but, rather, requires significant adjustments in terms of corporate gov-
ernance and organization. It is therefore necessary for boards of directors to increase their 
interest in and understanding of the risk profiles inherent in the business of their undertak-
ings. In other words, they must develop a risk-oriented governance framework permitting the 
necessary diffusion, at all corporate levels, of an appropriate risk culture and ensuring that 
the board has adequate knowledge and control of decision-making processes, risk manage-
ment, and operations in a “Solvency 2-compliant” context. In this regard, the introduction of 
a risk-based capital requirement system is intended to underline the importance of the risk 
management function and internal control systems [19].
Continuing with our analysis of the innovations introduced by the new regulatory frame-
work, it is essential that we underline a further and important innovation, namely consid-
eration of a broader and more complete range of risks for the purpose of calculating capital 
requirements as well as quantifying these more accurately. Indeed, whereas, with Solvency 
1, regulatory capital measured only the so-called “technical risks,” excluding such things as 
market risks from calculation, the new regime also considers these. Solvency 2, moreover, 
sets out to overcome a further limitation connected to the fact that Solvency 1 quantified the 
said technical risks in a more simplistic manner, that is, through application of flat rates, thus 
preventing due consideration of the size and riskiness of the various portfolios [20].
Assuming that each business, in tackling the transition from the old regulatory regime to 
the new, will take into account its own specific characteristics in terms of investment posi-
tion, business mix, and strategic objectives, it may be hypothesized that the above-mentioned 
innovations constitute, in a general sense, incentives for insurance undertakings to base their 
practical operations on certain “rules of conduct.” In this perspective, it is desirable, first and 
foremost, for insurance undertakings, as far as the assets side of the balance sheet is concerned, 
to proceed with careful selection of asset classes, favoring those which—particularly with 
regard to life business—permit better matching with liabilities (asset-liability  management) 
and are less correlated with market trends over more volatile and/or risky investments, which 
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are more capital-intensive. At the same time, insurance undertakings are obliged to deal with 
the dynamics of the current economic situation, featuring, in particular, low interest rates, 
and even negative ones in some markets and for certain maturities. In this regard, identifica-
tion and adoption of more adequate investment policies, based on which it is possible to select 
(new?) asset classes capable of guaranteeing an adequate return on the commitments entered 
into with policyholders, is undoubtedly desirable [21].
Turning our gaze to the liabilities side of the balance sheet, insurance undertakings are then 
required to implement more careful and selective insurance risk-taking, giving due con-
sideration to aspects relating to its capital-intensiveness, the profitability associated with 
different businesses, and, more generally, the principles of correct product governance [22]. 
In other words, the objective of insurance undertakings must be to “build” products and 
services capable of meeting the needs arising from the relevant market, as well as those 
of the distributions channels used for the purpose, taking due account of their risk/return 
constraints. Joint consideration of the factors we have just mentioned therefore requires 
insurance undertakings to conduct a major review of their product design, pricing, and 
distribution [23]. For this reason, particularly in life business, we are witnessing—and will 
increasingly witness in the future—the offering of a different product mix and a restruc-
turing of the sureties offered to policyholders. In truth, we are facing a trend, already in 
progress in Europe, leading to the replacement of life products involving the provision of 
certain guarantees by insurance undertaking (such as so-called “with-profit” products) with 
contracts in which the risk lies with the policy holder (“unit-linked” products); something 
which also imposes a transition from “traditional” life policies to “multiline” life products, 
which combine the guarantee of traditional products with the higher returns of unit-linked. 
It is clear, therefore, that the opportunity to benefit from the positive effects associated with 
risk diversification provided by Solvency 2 may only be fully seized by those insurance 
undertakings capable of operating in multiple business lines, since it is, in effect, closed to 
monoline undertakings.
A further “rule of conduct” upon which insurance undertakings should base their opera-
tions concerns greater use of risk mitigation techniques. In practice, we are referring, on one 
hand, to the use of financial derivatives,7 which permits adequate coverage of financial risks 
and reduction of asset/liability mismatch, notwithstanding the new requirements introduced 
by the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)8 and, on the other, with regard 
to insurance risks, to the use of both “traditional” reinsurance (benefitting from current soft 
market conditions) and so-called “Alternative Risk Transfer” (ART) techniques such as, for 
example, cat bonds. However, implementing Solvency 2 is not simply a question of capital 
requirements and accounting standards. It requires considerable adjustments to company 
governance and organization. In the first place, boards of directors must increase their interest 
in and their understanding of the risk profiles inherent in company activities. This does not 
mean that boards should only comprise technical experts or that market strategies need not be 
7It should be remembered that, similarly to Solvency I, the new regulatory framework, too, permits the use of financial 
derivatives insofar as they contribute to reducing risks or facilitating effective portfolio management (see Art. 132 of the 
Directive).
8EU Regulation No. 648/2012 of 4 July 2012.
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discussed—for insurance companies, understanding risk is the basis for any informed strate-
gic decision and, to a large extent, it is their business. The entire way that businesses are orga-
nized must change in order to introduce the new approach to risk assessment, which should 
neither be reduced to a cosmetic exercise for supervisory purposes, nor be relegated to the 
office of the chief risk officer, but it must play a key role in the management of the company. 
There are two basic logics—bottom-up approach, which is more invasive and starts from the 
analysis of all business processes to find the risks involved, and top-down approach, which 
starts from the risk analysis and tries to identify the processes that generated these risks. In 
any case, the involvement of risk owners is crucial. In the while, the top-down approach can-
not ignore the observation of past risk events, while the bottom-up approach is conducted 
independently from these past risk events. In other words, the top-down approach follows 
a backward-looking perspective, while the bottom-up approach follows a forward-looking 
perspective. For this reason, the best approach is the approach that can complement the two 
methodologies.
The evidence gathered so far from inspections and the initial ORSA findings are not entirely 
comforting, especially as regards smallest firms. We know that the transition will not be easy, 
but we are ready to work together with the companies, each assuming our own responsibility, 
to facilitate change [24].
4. Southeastern Europe market review9
4.1. Banking sector
The region of the Southeastern Europe (SEE) has experienced some significant changes in 
recent years. These changes can be observed from the political, economical, and demographic 
aspects, making an indirect influence on the financial system of the region. Croatia became 
a member of the European Union (EU), and the other countries of the Western Balkans 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia) continue with the slow process 
of  integration. Greece is still burdened with a huge public debt, Turkey suffers from problems 
related to the wars on its eastern border, while Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria continue 
adaptation to the unique EU market.
The financial system of the SEE countries is basically bank-centric. The system is dominated 
by commercial banks. The size of the banking sector differs between countries of the region, 
with the largest share of banks’ assets of GDP in Greece (220% in 2015) and the lowest in 
Romania (53% in 2015).
In all observed countries, except Turkey, there has been a high share of foreign ownership in 
total banking assets (from 68% in Greece to 90.4% in Romania). In Turkey, the banking sector 
is dominated by domestic banks (74% of total assets are held by domestic banks).
9The review is based on the survey fulfilled by national regulators of the SEE countries as well as the information published on their 
official websites.
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In all observed countries, net loans have the highest share in banks’ assets. Cash funds are the 
second largest item in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey, while gov-
ernment bonds are the second largest in Albania, Croatia, Greece, and Romania. Households 
and corporation deposits have the highest share in total banks’ liabilities in all observed coun-
tries. In Greece, European Central Bank borrowing makes a significant part of total liabilities 
(28% in 2015). Regarding the structure of loans, the loans to nonfinancial corporations and 
households have the largest share. In the structure of deposits, retail deposits have the largest 
share in all of the countries.
Regarding maturity, there is a significant mismatch between deposits and loans in all of the 
countries, except Albania and Turkey. In all observed countries, except these two, there is a 
high share of short-term deposits in total deposits and long-term loans in total loans. Romania 
has the highest share of short-term deposits (93% in 2015), while Croatia has the highest share 
of long-term loans (86.1% in 2015). In Albania and Turkey, respective shares of long-term 
deposits and loans in total deposits and loans were similar (approximately 70%).
Regarding the basic features of banking sector in 2015, capital adequacy ratio varied between 
15 and 21 in the observed countries, the highest being recorded in Croatia and Serbia.
In 2015, Turkey recorded the lowest ratio of nonperforming to total loans (3.2%) and Greece 
had the highest ratio (43.9%).
Most of the countries are in the process of adopting Basel III standards. In Greece, as it is a 
member of the Eurozone, the regulatory framework is based on and incorporates the Basel III 
framework and related provisions. Croatia started the implementation of Basel III in Croatian 
legislation in 2013, with the adoption of the new Credit Institutions Act transposing CRD IV, 
following its accession to the EU. Consequently, there have been some changes in the regula-
tory framework regarding the coverage of risky assets in capital and capital buffers.
4.2. Insurance sector
As far as the insurance sector of the SEE region is concerned, it mostly stagnated in recent 
years, with a slight increase in most of the countries except Greece, where premium volume 
significantly decreased. What is interesting is that for the countries that recently joined the 
EU, stagnation of the sector is more evident than in the nonmember countries where the 
premium volume is increasing. It looks like the first group of countries reached the limits con-
sidering their economies, while the second group of countries still has potential for growth. 
Reasons for such situation are different, and they can be caused by some internal changes on 
the market, like introduction of Motor Third Party Liability (MTPL) market liberalization in 
the newest EU member Croatia, or by some other macroeconomic issues.
Similar to banking, ownership structure of the insurers on the markets shows dominance of 
insurers with majority of foreign ownership. They cover more than half of the total premium on 
the local markets, excluding Slovenia, where foreign insurers cover 11.1% of the market. There 
are also many insurers from one SEE country (such as Slovenia and Croatia) operating on the 
markets of other countries of the region. The largest market share of the foreign insurers is regis-
tered in Montenegro and Macedonia, where foreign insurers cover more than 90% of the markets.
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The total premium of the SEE insurance market in 2015 reached the amount of EUR 21.018 
million with a decrease in total during last 5 years in spite of a slight increase in the premium 
in almost all countries. A decrease of the premium was noticed in the region’s most developed 
markets of Greece, Slovenia, and Croatia, caused by financial crisis or by MTPL market liberal-
ization (in case of Croatia). For this reason, if we exclude data for Turkey, we can observe that 
insurance premiums of the region have decreased by 10% in comparison with 2010. Slovenia 
and Croatia stopped recording negative trends and had an increase of premium in 2015. At 
the same time, total insurance premium of the Insurance Europe (IE) association members in 
2015 was EUR 1,199,714 million, with 4.2% of growth compared to 2010. Like in 2010, the SEE 
insurance market is still 1.8% of total IE premium.
The average insurance penetration for the SEE countries in 2015 was 1.78, and it decreased 
from 1.81% in 2010. The average insurance density was EUR 146.35, and it increased by 
3.7% in 5 years (EUR 141.15 in 2010). The average penetration of IE in 2015 was 7.4%, and it 
decreased from 8.9% in 2010, while insurance density was EUR 2.010 and it increased by 7.0% 
(EUR 1.879 in 2010). These data show that insurance penetration is 4.2 and insurance density 
13.7 times below the IE average for 2015. The largest insurance density in 2015 was in Slovenia 
(EUR 975), Greece (EUR 343), and Croatia (EUR 271), while the other countries had density 
below EUR 200 showing the characteristics of poor insurance markets.
Negative trends in the premium structure during last 5 years can be recognized by a decrease 
of share of life insurance in total premium. In 2015, the average share of life insurance in the 
region was 23.1% (25.8% in 2010), while the average share in the IE members was 60.9%. It 
shows that there was no improvement of insurance culture in the SEE market. The low share 
of life insurance is a result of macroeconomic instability, consumer unfamiliarity with finan-
cial transactions as well as less sophistication of the insurance products offered. The largest 
share of life insurance in 2015 was registered in Greece (48.4%), Croatia (33.6%), and Slovenia 
(29.7%), while the other countries had a share of life insurance below 25%.
Since financial system in the region is mostly bankocentric and the share of the insurance in 
the total financial assets is very low, the activities of the governments in the recent years were 
mostly focused on providing better regulation of the banks. Insurers are still waiting to be 
recognized as the important subject of interest in government policies.
As we previously mentioned, the total premium of EUR 21.018 million shows that the SEE 
insurance market is significantly behind the developed European markets, with only 1.8% 
of IE premium. Since the market size depends on the economy volume, we can compare this 
data only for the countries of similar population and economy size. Generally, Slovenia is the 
closest to the IE average, but there is a lot of variety among the other countries. On the other 
hand, common to all countries is a high potential for the market growth.
In 2015, the data for 8 countries (since we do not have complete data about the number of 
companies for all countries), comparing with 2010, show a slight decrease in the number 
of insurers in all countries except for Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia. Some countries still 
have disproportionately large number of companies in relation to market’s premium (BiH, 
Macedonia, and Montenegro). There are expected mergers and acquisitions in these coun-
tries, especially because of the new regulatory standards that are coming into force in the 
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future. The average premiums per company in BiH, Macedonia, and Montenegro are below 
EUR 15 million, which best explains a need for decrease in the number of companies. Slovenia 
had the largest average premium per company (EUR 91 million).
The insurers on the SEE market are mostly organized as nonlife insurers, and this type of orga-
nization of business activities is characteristic for local insurers, while the life insurance busi-
ness is mostly in the hands of insurers coming from the EU countries. A lack of insurance 
culture is most evident if we focus on the premium insurance structure. Namely, obligatory 
MTPL is still the dominant insurance product. A low competition level of local companies in 
life business forces them to focus on less profitable, nonlife business. Data for selected countries 
of SEE markets show that the average share of life insurance for SEE in 2015 was 34.2%, while 
MTPL covered 26.2%, and other nonlife 39.6%. During the last 5 years, the share of life insur-
ance has increased, decreasing the share of other nonlife. Greece has the largest market share of 
life insurance (48.4%), followed by Croatia (33.6%) and Slovenia (29.7%). From more detailed 
overview of MTPL shares in the countries, we can see that dominance of MTPL is most evident 
in BiH, Macedonia, and Montenegro, where it covers more than 40% of the total premium.
Since the last 5 years has been very important for Europe due to the introduction of new regulatory 
framework, Solvency 2, changes in legal and institutional framework can be observed in the con-
text of compliance with the new regulations. Only a few countries, already EU members, followed 
the deadlines for implementation of the Solvency 2 regime on the national regulatory framework. 
There are many reasons for this delay, but the key problem is with still underdeveloped market 
that cannot follow the rules that exist in the developed EU insurance market. That is accompa-
nied with poor institutional infrastructure, not capable of fully implementing even the Solvency 1 
regime. There are plenty of uncertainties facing the region regarding the Solvency 2 implementa-
tion in the insurance markets, and countries try to catch the pace according to their capabilities.
Most regulations in the countries are not compliant with the Solvency 2 regime, and some 
countries are still striving to fully implement Solvency 1 regime. There are some good exam-
ples, like Slovenia, Croatia, and Greece that are believed to follow the EU standards, but most 
of the others are going to adapt to the new standards as they are approaching the EU member-
ship. During last 5 years, they have been focused on improving the methodology of insurer 
reporting and the other aspects of market supervision.
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